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The limits of agrarian reform in Brazil
“The classic agrarian reform program, which most industrialized
countries have done in the northern hemisphere, democratizing the
property and creating the internal markets depend on a political project
of national development based on industrialization. This left the agenda
of Brazil. Not because it is not a way, but because the Brazilian industrial
bourgeoisie never had a national development project. This kind of land
reform is unviable by them, unfortunately”. João Pedro Stédile.
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a) The limits of the agrarian reform:
This text was born from an alert: land concentration in Brazil has grown in the last ten
years. As part of its economy reprimarization confined in a present-future framework
of exponential growth in demand for fuels (biodiesel), minerals (especially iron) and
food, the agrarian frontier of agribusiness has full-grown. Between 2003 and 2010, the
area of large farms increased from 214,843,865ha to 318,904,739ha, from 51.3% to
55.8% of the total, a 48.4% of increase of this profile of property in the period. The
other profiles have also grown during this period in terms of area; the smallholdings
evolved from 38.9 to 46.6 million hectares, small farms from 74.1 to 88.7 millions, and
medium properties from 88.1 to 113.8 million hectares. However, in percentage terms,
these three types of properties lost space.
The swiftness of these changes is explained by a positioning of the Brazilian economy
towards a greater specialization in the production of primary commodities (the socalled reprimarization). Between 2000 and 2009 the Brazilian participation in these
exports jumped from 2.77% to 4.66% and the participation of the country in the
exports of goods with high intensity (according to the methodology of UNCTAD, 2002),
decreases from 0.52% to 0.49%, a clear loss of market share. To some extent, these
changes arise from a strategy of currency appreciation in order to obtain productivity
gains in exporting, mining and oil production sectors, due to the growing global
demand led by China. On the other hand, evidently, and in a deeper way, it is on the
horizon deindustrialization and a form of integration into the world economy that
reproduce and extend the existence of large estates in the Brazilian society. We must
also consider that behind the issue of the exchange-rate appreciation it is the
dependence on the financial capital, which is pressing for a high interest rate and
mechanisms of fictitious wealth recovery via debt, certainly, based on the execution of
constant and extended primary surpluses.
1 Professores do Departamento de Economia da Universidade Federal do Espírito
Santo.

Finally, the Brazilian government and society, in tables of financial globalization, have
made a very clear choice, in which there is no room for reform in land ownership.
Obviously, the idea of land reform raises several interpretations, which is not the case
to discuss here. However, when using this term we refer broadly to a policy of
redistribution of land ownership in favor of small and medium properties, that is,
necessarily, for a tighter fiscal policy for large estates, especially the unproductive
ones, for a policy of incentives and subsidies, for an education policy and lending long
term credit at achievable rates. This definitely has not been the path taken. The
government did not even want, for instance, to change the reference parameters for
measuring the degree of utilization (GU) and the Degree of Efficiency of Farms (GEE),
which are still based on data from the Brazilian agriculture of 1975. That is, as Teixeira
notes, “In Brazil, the large productive property is so classified when observing the rate
of agricultural income 35 years ago”, which is obviously much lower than current rates
of productivity due to the massive use of manure, fertilizers, herbicides and new
planting techniques.
Another issue to be addressed is the acquisition of land in the country by foreign
capital. An example of this practice is to acquire land for the production of ethanol,
soy, corn, cultures related to the rising demand for agro-energy, food and raw
materials by the banking and financial capital, traditionally averse to tying up of
resources and related loss of liquidity. According to Sauer & Milk, as in World Bank
study, the global demand for land has been enormous, especially from 2008 on,
making the territorial dispute a global phenomenon, “the transfer of agricultural land
was approximately four million hectares per year before 2008, only between October
2008 and August 2009 were sold over 45 million hectares, of which a 75% in Africa and
another 3.6 million hectares in Brazil and Argentina”. Still with the authors, it is
possible to observe that the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the primary sector
grew from $2.4 to $13.1 billion between 2002 and 2008, showing an increase of 445%.
This is a new phase, extended, of the strategy to acquire a factor that will certainly be
scarce in the near future and, surely, the property speculation is at stake: it occurs in
Brazil, mainly in the “new” boundaries for the monoculture of soy, sugar cane in the
states of Tocantins, Goias, Mato Grosso do Sul and Minas Gerais, a 33% gain in land
prices, greatly inflating the cost of any policy of expropriation of land with a view to
reform. The apparent paradox of this strategy is the fact that the most evolved forms
of appreciation of the value interfere in the circuit D-D’, subvert the historical time and
retake a secular practice of real estate speculation, which has accompanied the history
of capitalism in the last thirty years, namely, a real estate speculation.
An example of this strategy is the role of the banker George Soros. According to a
report from October 2006, the man who has speculated against the Bank of England
and against almost all currencies in Asia and Brazil in 2002, is now investing in
agribusiness. This 76 years old man, with a fortune estimated at $7.2 billion, just joined
the team of foreign billionaires betting on Brazilian ethanol. As Bill Gates, owner of
Microsoft, and the Google boys Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Soros was excited with the
green fuel. He participated in the project to build three sugar and alcohol mills in Mato
Grosso do Sul. Enterprise value: $900 million. Together, the three units will process 11
million tons per year and produce one billion liters of alcohol. Apart from ethanol, the
Hungarian financier’s company, ADECO, also operates in cotton and coffee in the
Country. “When everything is working, the revenues from operations in Brazil may be
the same as in Argentina,” said Marcelo Vieira, the main partner of Soros in Brazil. It is
estimated that Soros’ rural operations in Argentina has reached a turnover of US$30
million.

The largest state-owned Chinese food industry, China National Agricultural
Development Group Corporation, is also an example of the offensive of international
capital on Brazilian soil. This company operates in 40 countries and 10,000 out of
80,000 employees work abroad. The company owns six thousand acres in Tanzania and
set up business in the food sector also in Guinea, Benin and Zambia and has entered
into Argentina and Peru. Other Chinese companies have also purchased land in several
countries with the same goal: ensuring products to China that are essential to its
economic growth and urbanization of hundreds of millions of people. Since the last
decade, the Chinese government is increasing investment in natural resources
elsewhere. So far, its most impressive breakthrough occurred in Africa, where
investments in mining and later the purchase of land were accompanied by
cooperation projects with the host countries, mostly poor and low-ratingdevelopment. The next step in the strategy was to negotiate projects with several Latin
American governments. An example of this onslaught of international capital on the
Brazilian land and the strategy adopted by CNADC (Chinese state-owned of agricultural
development), which in 2011 announced an investment of seven billion dollars
earmarked for participation in projects of grain crops expansion in the state of Goias
with an estimated area of 2.4 million acres devoted to soybean production that will be
exported to China. It should be noted that this country has been consolidating an
international base of supply of raw materials and foodstuffs from Australia, Indonesia,
countries in Africa and Latin America over the past few years. Highlighting the fact that
a 93% of capital invested in Brazil in 2010 comes from SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises).
In addition to the international conditions, which impose a reprimarization to the
Brazilian economy, there are international constraints that reject the possibility of a
comprehensive agrarian reform. In this plan, successive Brazilian governments, despite
of a supposedly closer government of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva to the cause of agrarian
reform, have perpetuated a land situation that has been slightly modified in the past
few years. In 2009, a 0.91% of the properties, referring to properties with more than
1,000ha, accounted for a 44.42% of the occupied area, while the ones holdings less
than 10ha occupied only a 2.36% of the area, revealing the high degree of land
concentration in this country. Another indicator is the Gini coefficient applied to the
concentration of land: in 1967 this index equaled 0.836, evolving to 0.854 in 2006.
The fact is that, historically both, in military and authoritarian governments, whether
in governments marked by electoral democracy (which we have left), the structure of
land ownership has slightly changed over the last fifty years. The chart below shows
the different profiles of land ownership underwent minor changes between 1960 and
2006, revealing that beyond an option of the current government, the non-completion
of a more profound land and agrarian reform has been perpetuated as a policy of
State. After the end of the military dictatorship and the democratization of the
national political scene in 1985, it would be expected that the popular forces and more
equitable social projects occupied spaces of decisions and allowed the reform. To
some extent, this was the attemption in the National Plan for Agrarian Reform in 1985
and 1988 Federal Constitution. However, with the subsequent accession to the
neoliberal model and the related erosion of citizenship, which we saw was just the
opposite: despite of the percentage-increase in arable land available, 26.7% of the
country to 31.3% between 1989 and 2010, it revealed the persistence of inequality, of
land concentration and the property profiles shown below:

Gráfico 1 - % arable land owned between 1960 and 2006.
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It would be expected that in a country where land reform was part of a structural
project of agrarian transformation, the proportions above outlined presented
significant changes, since it is a long historical series (almost fifty years). However, the
Brazilian case, as observed in the long term, indicates inflexibility in regard to the
percentage share of ownership tracks on the farmland. Properties with less than ten
hectares in this period amounted to approximately half of the total, decreasing to
47.86% in 2006, when it would be expected, if the option had been the land reform,
that this profile would increase its percentage due to the reduction of other property
profiles. These data suggest that the change in land ownership structure is not set as a
project in Brazilian government and society in the long term, the option seems to be
“to freeze” the structure of land with compensation policies to ensure the viability of
small farms but do not expand, or to expand up to the point where they do not threat
the absolute predominance of large property linked to agribusiness exports. Policies
such as PRONAF (Program for Strengthening Family Agriculture), ATER (Technical
Assistance and Rural Extension) Bolsa Verde (which includes a benefit of $ 300.00
monthly, seeds and tanks) and Bolsa Familia itself, which also covers portions of the
rural population, are examples of this strategy. These policies make up what Delgado
called “Constrained Adjustment”, because they do not propose any output and they
are designated for a minority of small family farmers and settlers.
The current president, Dilma Rousseff, has used these mechanisms in combating rural
poverty, which according to her understanding, affect in a more brutal manner the
economic system than the current configuration of land ownership. The predominant
logic has been to supply an income to families until they are able to integrate the
production structure and the market. This policy is explained, in our opinion, by some
factors:
a) Absence of prospects for changing in the economic model;

b) fiscal and structural limits of our economy and the(growing) related need to
generate surpluses through export of commodities feasible only on large scales (large
estates), especially in fields related to the production of biofuels;
c) the abrupt rise in land prices, which raises the costs of land reform;
d) the political strength of the caucus (rural row of seats)and forceful defense that the
Brazilian government has made this quite specialized form of insertion in the global
economy, exemplified in the adoption of the new Forest Code, which leaves openings
for maintenance and expansion of deforestation;
e) the lack of mobilization of the largest portion of the population, for today only a
15.6% of the population is allocated in the agricultural sectors, with only a 11% of the
workforce allocated in rural areas, indicating that the high degree of urbanization of
Brazilian society hinders the universal of agrarian reform banner.
f) with laudable exceptions, such as the MST and Via Campesina, the degree of political
mobilization on this issue is very low.
In this context, it is no wonder that the credit for settlements has declined significantly
between 2008 and 2011 (1.6 billion to nine hundred million dollars), as well as the
disbursement of resources for the acquisition of land for agrarian reform, which were
reduced from 1.92 billion in 2005 to 482 million reais in 2011. In fact, the government
has disbursed below the approved LOA (Law of Annual Budget), as in the case of credit
granting, where nine hundred million dollars were approved for 2011, of which only
thirty million were effectively spent. It is not surprising, in these terms, that the
number of families being settled have been considerably reduced in recent years, as
seen in the chart below:
Gráfico 2 – Families settled by INCRA
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b) Resistence:
The current dilemmas listed above do not indicate the absence of struggle and
resistance, they just give us a more accurate idea of the challenge scales to social
movements whose flag passes through land reform. This is not a recent demand of the
Brazilian society, it has emerged with great force in the Peasant Leagues in the 1950’s.

Initially created in Pernambuco, they have spread into other states expanding agrarian
disputes about the reality of the country. The Leagues spoke on behalf of a broad and
diverse category of workers that included tenants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers and
smallholders who produced a subsistence crop and traded the surpluses produced in
their own or another land. In this sense, we should remember that the use of the term
“peasant” seems to have been a factor of identification and unit to designate such a
broad category opposed to a common adversary, called by political leaders as
“unproductive and decadent large estates”.
As the represented layers are basically dependent on the direct production on
transferred, rented or own (small farms) land, we can understand why they coalesced
around causes linked to immediate possession and enjoyment of the land. The overall
process of politicization that occurred in this period, particularly since 1960, easily
converted individual or located demands for land into broader claims. This
mobilization, along with the growing strength of trade unions and some political
approximation to the government of Joao Goulart, was enough for the most
reactionary sectors of Brazilian society to sponsor a military coup in 1964, when the
popular forces in favor of land reform were strikingly persecuted and annihilated by
the national army and its supporters, opening up space for an economic model even
more concentrating of wealth, income and land. There is, at this moment, intense
modernization of Brazilian agriculture, the “painful modernization” with capitalist
development in the field without changing the structure of land ownership, which
resulted in the impoverishment of the agricultural population and a major rural-urban
exodus of twentieth century.
According to the organic intellectual Joao Pedro Stedile, the Movement of Landless
Rural Workers – the MST – derives directly from the Peasant Leagues. Officially
founded in the city of Cascavel-PR in 1984, this movement comes from the growing
political activism itself towards the end military dictatorship, the very painful
modernization, which showed a series of contradictions in rural Brazil, the
participation of the more progressive sectors of the Catholic Church and the political
history of the South, region where the movement was originated.
As Bernard M. Fernandes in his book The Formation of the MST in Brazil, the MST was
born in the occupation of land and this action is its first instrument of struggle against
land concentration and the State. According to him, because the non implementation
of agrarian reform, the landless intensify the struggle through occupations, requiring
the government to carry out a policy of rural settlements, which, if it is not ideal as we
have seen, at least it is placed. The organization of the MST as a social movement
today is already present in almost all states of the federation, which illustrates their
representation in national terms.
The history of MST, as the history of the whole Brazilian rural life, is marked by great
violence. In one of the most brutal battles, in Eldorado dos Carajas-PA, nineteen
landless workers were executed at point black range by the police on April 17th, 1996.
The confrontation occurred when about five hundred thousand landless blocked the
highway BR-155, which connects this city to the state capital, Belem. From the national
protests and demonstrations came the pressures that triggered the creation of the
Ministry of Agrarian Development in 1999, showing triumph in the movement, later
frustrated as it could be seen.
Because of their action strategies, involving the invasion of unproductive land, the
occupation of public buildings, conducting marches (such as the National March for
Agrarian Reform, Employment and Justice, which came out of Governador Valadares,
Minas Gerais, and went to Brasilia, a distance of 1,032 km, which was attended by
thousands of landless in 1997), the Pastoral Land, education at various levels (literacy,

high school, the teaching of the mystical, undergraduate and graduate), the foundation
of the Florestan Fernandes National School and the Social Movements Popular
University, which put in touch critical intellectuals, social leaders and activists, the
MST, beside Via Campesina, has managed to keep it for nearly thirty years as one of
the main social movements in Latin America, with over 1.5 million members, and it is
certainly responsible for the maintenance of land reform as one of the issues of social
demand. However, as we saw, as land reform loses ground in Brazilian government
and society, the channels of access to a more broadly land and agrarian policy narrows.
The fact is that in the current framework, the Agrarian reform flag; an old flag of the
capitalist development and as last bourgeois, fights against the large state, the fight
against the agribusiness, to combat against the Brazilian' insertion in the global
economy, fight against the current consumption patterns, to fight for new energy
matrix, the fight against food contamination by pesticides and fertilizers, anticapitalism, the revolutionary struggle. This fight goes on. In 2010, based on the
Pastoral Land Commission, there were 638 conflicts over land and only by this
mechanism the Agrarian Reform can reclaim the space on stage today, totally adverse.

